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Abstract: Corporations increasingly assert the right to discriminate, based 
either on free speech claims, religious freedom claims, or statutory claims 
arising from the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Such claims have 
been considered by the Supreme Court in Hobby Lobby (RFRA) 
and Masterpiece Cakeshop (First Amendment), and in both cases the 
Court held in favor of the business.  
In neither case, however, did the Court address a fundamental flaw 
with the arguments of the company asserting the speech and religion 
claims: that the claims depend on the rejection of corporate personhood. 
The putative religious and speech claims arose not from the beliefs of the 
companies but of their dominant shareholders. But corporate 
“personhood” means the interests of the firm are distinct from those of the 
shareholders. Allowing companies to assert the beliefs of shareholders as 
their own contradicts established doctrine and risks corporate 
manipulation of regulations designed to be generally applicable.  
The authors have been active as amici in various cases in which 
corporations have asserted right to discriminate. This chapter marks the 
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 For decades, the Supreme Court has grappled with cases that pit 
democratic commitments to end discrimination with constitutional 
commitments to free speech and free exercise of religion. A private civic 
organization wants to maintain its all-male organizational personality, but 
state regulation forces it to admit women into membership. Do the 
organization’s free speech rights — which include the right to associate — 
allow it to exclude women notwithstanding the state requirement?1 The 
organizer of a St. Patrick’s Day parade wishes to exclude a LGBTQ group 
that wants to march, and state regulation says the parade must invite the 
group. Does the First Amendment allow the parade organizer to exclude 
the marchers he dislikes?2 The Boy Scouts’ leadership finds out a scout 
master is gay. Do the Scouts have a constitutional right to kick him out of 
the organization, even if state law says they cannot?3   
 
 These cases have proven difficult enough. In the first case, Roberts 
v. U.S. Jaycees, the Court ruled against the organization. In the second 
and third, Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of 
Boston and Boy Scouts v. Dale, the Court ruled in favor of the organizer 
and the organization. 
 
* Professor of Law and Dean’s Distinguished Scholar, Boston College Law School. 
The authors thank the editors of this volume, Elizabeth Pollman and Robert 
Thompson, for the invitation to participate and their helpful comments on earlier 
drafts of this chapter. The authors also thank Indigo Harris and Leigha Henson 
for excellent research assistance. 
** Partner, Orrick, Herrington, & Sutcliffe LLP. The views expressed in this 
chapter are those of Mr. Rubens and not necessarily those of Orrick or its clients. 
Mr. Rubens served as a law clerk at the Supreme Court during the 2013 Term. 
This chapter’s discussion of cases decided during that term relies solely on 
publicly available materials. 
1 Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984). 
2 Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Grp. of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 
(1995). 
3 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
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 Newer cases add a wrinkle that significantly complicates matters. In 
the older cases, the organizations asserting the right to exclude unwanted 
members were organized as non-profits. Increasingly, however, for-profit 
businesses are asserting First Amendment-based rights to be exempted 
from otherwise applicable regulations, most prominently prohibitions on 
discrimination against LGBTQ customers. Does the fact that the 
constitutional claimant is a for-profit corporation change the analysis?4 
This chapter argues that it should. 
 
 The best-known example of a for-profit corporation asserting a 
constitutional right to discriminate arose in Colorado, where a bakery 
called Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. refused to sell a wedding cake to a 
same-sex couple.5 But Masterpiece Cakeshop was only one of a burgeoning 
number of profit-seeking businesses asserting constitutional rights to 
discriminate. A florist in Washington State doing business as Arlene’s 
Flowers, Inc. refused to sell floral arrangements to a gay couple wishing to 
celebrate their wedding.6 A tax preparer in Indiana refused to help a same-
sex couple file their taxes.7 A Kentucky printing company refused to print 
pro-LGBTQ messages on t-shirts.8 An art studio in Arizona refused to 
design custom wedding invitations for same-sex ceremonies.9 
 
 The constitutional questions embedded in these cases will continue 
to be debated. They are complex. Companies rest their arguments on 
principles of both free speech and religious freedom. Although the 
Supreme Court ultimately resolved Masterpiece Cakeshop on other 
grounds, the business there argued that its production of a wedding cake 
was speech, and that the state anti-discrimination laws forcing it to sell it 
to a gay couple acted as an unconstitutional coercion of speech.10 The 
bakery also argued that the state regulation amounted to an infringement 
of the bakery’s religious freedom contrary to the Free Exercise clause. 
 
4 For the purpose of this article, unless the text indicates otherwise, “corporation” 
should be assumed to mean “for-profit corporation.” 
5 Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civ. Rts. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018). 
6 Washington v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 441 P.3d 1203 (Wash. 2019). 
7 See Kayla Epstein, Christian tax preparer turns away lesbian couple on 




8 Lexington-Fayette Urb. Cnty. Hum. Rts. Comm’n v. Hands on Originals, 592 
S.W.3d 291 (Ky. 2019). 
9 Brush & Nib Studio v. City of Phoenix, 448 P.3d 890 (Ariz. 2019). 
10 Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1726. 
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 This latter contention tracks the form of arguments made in a 
related case worthy of mention — Burwell v Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.11 In 
that case, a company asserted a religious right to be exempted from the 
Affordable Care Act’s requirement that employers provide health 
insurance covering contraceptive care at no cost to the employee. The 
asserted exemption was statutory, arising from the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act’s protections for religious people who are substantially 
burdened by the requirements of a federal law.12 Hobby Lobby, Inc., 
argued that the ACA burdened its religious freedom, and that RFRA gave it 
an exemption from otherwise applicable law.13 Though Hobby Lobby was 
a statutory case, and the law the company wanted to be exempted from 
was the ACA rather than state anti-discrimination law, the framework of 
the case was quite similar to Masterpiece Cakeshop. A company asserted a 
right to be exempted from otherwise applicable regulatory provisions, 
claiming that those requirements burdened the company’s protected 
speech or religious interests. 
 
 These cases reverberate with classical constitutional conflicts. 
States and the federal government assert regulatory control over a 
corporation’s behavior in the marketplace; corporations assert rights-
based claims that would exempt them from that regulatory control. 
 
 Notice, however, that while all of these cases present as 
constitutional cases (or statutory cases applying constitutional doctrines) 
they all have embedded in them, and indeed depend on, matters of 
corporate law and principle. In each case, the arguments asserted by the 
corporation arise not from the free speech or religious freedom interests of 
the company itself but of a dominant shareholder.14 In Masterpiece 
 
11 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014). 
12 RFRA originally applied to state burdens as well, but the Supreme Court struck 
down its application to states in City of Boerne v. Flores. See 521 U.S. 507, 533-
34 (1997).  In enacting RFRA, Congress adopted “a statutory rule comparable to 
the constitutional rule rejected in [Employment Div. v.] Smith,” providing that 
the government “may not …. substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion,” 
even if that burden is imposed by a generally applicable law. 494 U.S. 872 (1990); 
Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente União do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 424 
(2006). 
13 The case also included the consolidated claims of another company, Conestoga 
Wood Specialties Corporation, which sought a similar exemption based on the 
religious beliefs of its owners . See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 700-03. 
14 Individuals who own and operate businesses do often appear as named parties 
in these cases. As we discuss below, however, courts adjudicating discrimination 
claims and evaluating First Amendment defenses to those claims should take care 
to distinguish between individuals’ roles as shareholders of the discriminating 
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Cakeshop, for example, the bakery’s dominant shareholder was a man 
named Jack Phillips, and it was his religious and political beliefs that were 
allegedly burdened by the state’s anti-discrimination statute. Implicit in 
the company’s constitutional arguments was a claim that Phillips’s 
constitutional interests should be projected onto the company. That is, the 
arguments in Masterpiece Cakeshop — and Hobby Lobby, Arlene’s 
Flowers, and the other cases — depend on the premise that the 
corporation can assert the shareholders’ speech and religion interests. 
That asserted unity is contrary to centuries of corporate law principles that 
establish corporations as their own legal and constitutional entities, 
distinct from their shareholders. 
 
 Under those longstanding corporate-law principles, corporations 
are distinct legal persons, separate from their investors. Thus in cases like 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, corporate “personhood” represents a reason to 
deny corporations’ rights-based claims to avoid regulatory obligations.15 
To be clear, we recognize that corporations have constitutional rights that 
can be asserted in litigation. But those rights must belong to the 
corporation itself and not be mere projections of the interests of 
shareholders. Corporate law must inform the constitutional analysis.16 
 
corporation and as agents, managers, or employees of the discriminating entity. 
See infra at note 65. 
15 For a more robust articulation of this point, see KENT GREENFIELD, 
CORPORATIONS ARE PEOPLE TOO (AND THEY SHOULD ACT LIKE IT) (2018). For a 
comprehensive historical account of the development of corporate constitutional 
rights that describes how corporate personhood tends to reduce corporate 
constitutional rights claims, see ADAM WINKLER, WE THE CORPORATIONS, HOW 
AMERICAN BUSINESSES WON THEIR CIVIL RIGHTS (2018); and Adam Winkler, 
Corporate Personhood and Constitutional Rights for Corporations, 42 NEW 
ENG. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021). 
16 The authors of this chapter filed an amicus brief in both Masterpiece Cakeshop 
and Arlene’s Flowers. See Brief of Amici Curiae Corporate Law Professors in 
Support of Respondents, Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colo. Civ. Rts. Comm’n, 138 S. 
Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111), 2017 WL 5127303; Brief for Professor Kent 
Greenfield as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, Washington v. Arlene’s 
Flowers, Inc., 441 P.3d 1203 (Wash. 2019) (No. 91615-2). In both cases, we 
argued that the free speech and religious interests of the shareholders should not 
be automatically projected onto the corporation. In addition, we argued that 
courts should be particularly skeptical of claims asserted by corporations that 
would exempt them from otherwise applicable laws and regulations, especially 
when such exemptions would give them a competitive advantage in the 
marketplace. (In both cases, the court ruled on different grounds and did not 
address our corporate law arguments.) One of us — Greenfield — also helped 
write an amicus brief in Hobby Lobby, in which some of these arguments were 
set out. See Amicus Curiae Brief of Corporate and Criminal Law Professors in 
Support of Petitioners, Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby, 572 U.S. 1011 (2014) (Nos. 13-
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 The structure of this chapter is as follows. In Part II, we set out the 
longstanding principle of corporate separateness and explain why it is 
important. In Part III, we argue why this notion should not be ignored in 
constitutional law, particularly where a for-profit corporation seeks an 
exemption from general law based on the asserted religious or political 
beliefs of its owners. In Part IV, we argue that in measuring the 
constitutional claims of corporations, courts should not reflexively 
presume the sincerity of political or religious beliefs asserted by 
corporations, especially when such the recognition of those beliefs would 
exempt the businesses from regulatory constraints applicable to their 
competitors. 
 
II. Corporate Separateness as Core Principle 
 
 In the increasingly frequent cases in which corporations claim a 
constitutional right to be exempted from laws prohibiting discrimination, 
the facts follow a typical pattern. Masterpiece Cakeshop is paradigmatic. 
There, a gay couple asked the bakery to create a cake for their wedding 
celebration. Jack Phillips, the principal owner of the bakery, refused, 
maintaining that his religious beliefs were inconsistent with participating 
in a celebration of a same-sex marriage. The state brought an 
administrative action against the store, and the bakery asserted 
constitutional free speech and free exercise arguments as defenses to the 
state’s action. The argument was that to force the bakery to create a cake 
for the couple would amount to compelled speech and would violate 
Phillips’ religious freedom to not be forced to engage in activities he 
believed were sinful.17 
 
 In these types of cases, the constitutional claims are brought by the 
company rather than the shareholder. It is the company — not its 
shareholders —  that is subject to regulatory requirements not to 
discriminate.18 So the viability of the constitutional claims of companies 
 
354, -356) 2014 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 407. This chapter marks the first time 
that these arguments have appeared in a scholarly format. 
17 See Masterpiece Caskeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1726-27. 
This framework was similar in Arlene’s Flowers. There, a florist refused to 
provide flower arrangements for a wedding ceremony of same-sex couple. The 
florist defended against the state administrative action against it, arguing that the 
state anti-discrimination law operated so as to force the florist’s principal owner, 
Barronelle Stutzman, to violate her political and religious beliefs. 441 P.3d at 
1203 
18 The obligations to refrain from discrimination typically attach to the business. 
In Colorado, for example, the anti-discrimination statute applied to public 
accommodations, which must be a “place of business.” COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-
601(1) (2016). To the extent that Phillips had a duty not to discriminate, it was as 
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such as Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. depends on the Court’s willingness to 
assume the corporation holds sincere political or religious beliefs that 
operate to exempt it from otherwise applicable law.19 But in these cases it 
is not typically the corporation that holds any such beliefs. In Masterpiece 
Cakeshop itself, it was Phillips who was the “cake artist” and who refused 
to sell a wedding cake to a same-sex couple because of — in the words of 
the petition for certiorari  — “his” religious beliefs.20 In fact, Phillips 
characterized the question before the Court to be whether Colorado could 
compel “him” to violate “his” sincere religious beliefs, not the beliefs of the 
corporation in which he owned shares.21 
 
 It was Phillips, not the company, who asserted a “deep religious 
faith,”22 and it was “Phillips’s voice”23 that was allegedly being compelled 
in violation of the “core tenets of his faith.”24 He did not assert a compelled 
speech claim on behalf of the company but stated it was “his artistic 
expression” at issue.25 Cakes were “his” expression because “he intends to, 
and does in fact, communicate through them.”26 He staked his coerced 
speech claim on the notion that the cakes embody “great religious meaning 
for him.”27 
 
an employee of a place of business, not as a shareholder. As discussed below, this 
distinction makes a difference for purposes of constitutional analysis.  
19 In Hobby Lobby, the Court considered the distinct statutory question of 
whether for-profit corporations qualify as “person[s]” that could “exercise … 
religion” within the meaning of RFRA. 573 U.S. at 707. A divided Court 
concluded that closely held corporations are protected under that statute. Id. at 
705-06. That holding, in turn, depended on Congress’s instruction that the 
statutory term “exercise of religion” “be construed in favor of a broad protection 
of religious exercise,” which the Court viewed as “an obvious effort to effect a 
complete separation from First Amendment case law.” Id. at 694-96. The Court’s 
decision did not address claims under the First Amendment or the question 
discussed in this chapter: whether for-profit corporations should be entitled to 
obtain exemptions from general law based on the beliefs of their shareholders.  
See id. at 735. 
20 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civ. Rts. 
Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111), 2016 WL 3971309, at *1 (July 22, 
2016). 
21 Id. 
22 Brief for Petitioners, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civ. Rts. Comm’n, 
138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111), 2017 WL 3913762, at *1 (Aug. 31, 2017). 
23 Id. at 2. 
24 Id. at 9. 
25 Id. at 17. 
26 Id. at 19 (emphasis added). 
27 Id. at 22 (emphasis added). 
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 So in Masterpiece Cakeshop and in other cases like it, the 
constitutional claims of a corporation to be exempted from anti-
discrimination law can only succeed if the company can claim the 
shareholders’ religious beliefs as its own. But Phillips and Masterpiece 
Cakeshop were not the same in that case, and shareholders and the 
companies in which they hold stock are not the same more generally. 
Shareholders and companies are not identical for purposes of corporate 
law, and they cannot be deemed identical for purposes of First 
Amendment law. 
 
 Indeed, it is fair to say that the first principle of corporate law is 
that for-profit corporations are entities that possess legal interests of their 
own and a legal identity separate and distinct from their shareholders. 
This legal “personhood” holds true whether the for-profit corporation has 
two, two hundred, or two million shareholders. In each scenario, the 
corporate entity is distinct in its legal interests and existence from those 
who contribute capital to it. 
 
 This separation is not an ancillary part of corporate law and 
governance but “a general principle of corporate law deeply ‘ingrained in 
our economic and legal systems.’”28 It is the sine qua non of the wealth-
creating legal innovation of the corporate form. The rationale behind 
corporate separateness is to encourage entrepreneurial activity by 
founders, investment by passive investors, and risk-taking by corporate 
managers.29 The corporate veil is a profound but simple device helping to 
achieve all three of these goals. Indeed, it is impossible to imagine a 
workable legal framework for corporate governance without such 
separation. “[I]ncorporation’s basic purpose is to create a distinct legal 
entity, with legal rights, obligations, powers, and privileges different from 
those of the natural individuals who created it, who own it, or whom it 
employs.”30 The corporation is separate from its shareholders not only for 
 
28 United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 61 (1998) (quoting William O. Douglas 
& Carrol M. Shanks, Insulation from Liability Through Subsidiary 
Corporations, 39 YALE L.J. 193 (1929)). 
29 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the 
Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 93-97 (1985). 
30 Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 533 U.S. 158, 163 (2001). The 
centrality of corporate separateness is well established and longstanding. See 
Burnet v. Clark, 287 U.S. 410, 415 (1932) (a “corporation and its stockholders are 
generally to be treated as separate entities”); New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 
292 U.S. 435, 442 (1934) (“As a general rule a corporation and its stockholders 
are deemed separate entities ….”); 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON 
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 455 (U. Chicago Press 1979) (“[I]t has been found 
necessary … to constitute artificial persons, who may maintain a perpetual 
8 
purposes of asset partitioning but also for purposes of regulatory 
partitioning. As Mariana Pargendler explains in another chapter in this 
volume, corporations and their shareholders derive significant benefits 
from their treatment as distinct entities for purposes of regulation and 
legal oversight.31 
 
 Because the corporation is a separate entity, its shareholders are 
not responsible for its debts. This “privilege of limited liability,” as 
protected by the corporate veil, is “the corporation’s most precious 
characteristic.”32 The advantages of that separation redound to 
corporations of all sizes. Although the term “corporation” sometimes calls 
to mind large, publicly-traded enterprises, incorporation provides equally 
critical benefits to smaller businesses even when their shares are not 
publicly traded. One of the most compelling reasons for a small business to 
incorporate is so that its shareholders can acquire the protection of the 
corporate veil. By incorporating a business, the founders and investors 
insulate their personal assets from risk. Absent significant misconduct and 
fraud, shareholders in a corporation cannot lose any more than their 
original investment. If the corporation cannot pay its bills, the creditors—
not the shareholders—bear the loss, with only very narrow exceptions.33 
 
 Even where a single shareholder owns all the corporation’s shares, 
the corporate veil cannot be pierced absent significant misconduct or fraud 
on the part of the shareholder. This presumptive impermeability of the 
corporate veil has been confirmed by “thousands of instances where a sole 
 
succession, and enjoy a kind of legal immortality. These artificial persons are 
called bodies politic, bodies corporate, … or corporations ….”). 
31 See Mariana Pargendler, Regulatory Partitioning as a Key Function of 
Corporate Personality, Handbook On Corporate Purpose And Personhood [Page 
Number] (Elizabeth Pollman & Robert Thompson, eds.) (“In dissociating the 
regulatory status of the corporation from its shareholder composition, regulatory 
partitioning provides important benefits.”) 
32 WILLIAM W. COOK, THE PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATION LAW 19 (1925). 
33 The leading treatise on closely-held corporations notes that, in addition to 
limited liability,“[t]here may [be other benefits] from the recognition of the 
separate entity[:] the participants in the enterprise may be entitled to claim 
benefits as an employee for purposes of workers’ compensation, social security, 
unemployment compensation or other entitlement statutes. A corporate officer or 
employee who is also the sole or controlling shareholder of the corporation has 
sometimes been able to successfully assert a claim as an employee for workers’ 
compensation. Similarly, some courts respect the separate entity of a close 
corporation so that shareholder-employees qualify for social security benefits for 
which they would not be eligible if self-employed.” 1 F. HODGE O’NEAL & ROBERT 
B. THOMPSON, O’NEAL AND THOMPSON’S CLOSE CORPORATIONS AND LLCS: LAW 
AND PRACTICE § 1:15 (rev. 3d ed. 2017) (footnotes omitted). 
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shareholder was held not liable for either tort or contract obligation of his 
wholly owned corporation.”34 
 
 Because of these benefits, founders of even small businesses 
routinely choose the corporate form or another limited liability business 
form for the organization of their enterprise. If entrepreneurs want to 
remain legally identified with their businesses, they can organize them as 
sole proprietorships or partnerships. But the cost of doing so is the 
exposure to much greater financial and legal risks. 
 
The corporate form insulates entrepreneurs from those risks and 
acts as a subsidy to entrepreneurs and business development by offering a 
way to shift those risks to creditors, tort victims, and the public at large. As 
David Millon has argued, “the best way to understand the purpose of 
limited liability is as a subsidy designed to encourage business investment. 
The subsidy comes at the expense of corporate creditors.”35 Indeed, “[b]y 
allowing entrepreneurs to externalize these costs of doing business, 
limited liability provides a subsidy paid for by uncompensated tort 
victims.”36 
 
 In Masterpiece Cakeshop, the company argued it should be exempt 
from state anti-discrimination laws because of the religious values of its 
controlling shareholder,37 while seeking to maintain the benefits of 
 
34 GEORGE D. HORNSTEIN, CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE  § 751 (1959); see 
generally STEPHEN B. PRESSER, PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL § 1.1 (2017) (“It is 
now accepted as one of the first principles of American law that those who own 
shares in corporations, whether such shareholders are individuals or are 
themselves corporations, normally are not liable for the debts of their 
corporations.”); Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical 
Study, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1036 (1991). The Supreme Court has recognized the 
distinction between the company and its shareholders even when there was only  
a sole shareholder. See Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99 (1988) (sole 
shareholder has no Fifth Amendment right to resist a subpoena to the 
corporation for corporate documents that personally incriminate him). 
35 See DAVID K. MILLON, PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL, FINANCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE LIMITS OF LIMITED LIABILITY, 56 EMORY L.J. 1305, 1307 
(2007). 
36 Id. at 1324. 
37 Throughout the litigation, it was presumed that Phillips was the dominant 
shareholder, and he stated in his Supreme Court briefs that he and his wife were 
the only shareholders. But he did not specify his percentage of share ownership 
nor did he state explicitly that he was the majority owner. See supra, note 24 at ii. 
Colorado does not require private companies to disclose their ownership 
structure, see COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 7-102-102, -90-501, and it was not apparent in 
the record whether the shareholding percentages had changed over time. 
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corporate separateness for all other purposes. The corporation had 
benefited from its separateness in countless ways, and Phillips had been 
insulated from actual and potential corporate liabilities since inception. 
Yet once the company was required to sell a wedding cake to a couple 
whose union Phillips did not want to support, the company and its 
shareholder asked the Supreme Court to disregard that separateness in 
order to avoid a regulation they would rather not obey. In effect, Phillips 
argued that the corporate veil was only a one-way ratchet: its shareholders 
can get protection from tort or contract liability by standing behind the 
veil, but the corporation can ask a court to disregard the corporate veil 
whenever the company is required by law to act in a way that offends a 
shareholder’s beliefs. 
 
 But shareholders cannot have their cake and eat it too. As the 
Supreme Court had previously held, “One who has created a corporate 
arrangement, chosen as a means of carrying out his business purposes, 
does not have the choice of disregarding the corporate entity in order to 
avoid the obligations which the statute lays upon it for the protection of 
the public.”38 
 
 Federal and state courts do pierce the corporate veil occasionally as 
an equitable remedy. Usually this occurs when corporate formalities are 
disregarded, when shareholders have used the veil to commit fraud, or 
when the corporate entity was created for the transparent purpose of 
 
Originally chartered in 1992, the company had gone through at least three 
business forms: it began as a corporation, became a non-profit corporation after 
the couple who were refused service filed charges of discrimination, and 
ultimately changed to a limited liability company before the Supreme Court 
proceedings. See Masterpiece Cakeshop Incorporated, Certificate and Articles of 
Incorporation of Masterpiece Cakeshop Incorporated (Dec. 2, 1992), available at 
http://tinyurl.com/yac5ol43; Masterpiece Cakeshop Ltd, Articles of 
Incorporation for a Nonprofit Corporation (Nov. 1, 2012), available at 
http://tinyurl.com/ycvhupdf; Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd., Articles of 
Organization (July 5, 2017), available at http://tinyurl.com/ybkn9ksx. While 
Phillips repeatedly equated his interests with those of the corporation, Phillips 
did not appear in its chartering documents of the latter iteration. The sole 
incorporator was an attorney, and the company’s “initial principal office” was a 
law firm.  See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd., Articles of Organization (July 5, 2017), 
available at http://tinyurl.com/ybkn9ksx. 
38 Schenley Distillers Corp. v. United States, 326 U.S. 432, 437 (1946); see 
Moline Props. v. Comm’r, 319 U.S. 436 (1943) (holding that even a sole 
shareholder cannot seek to sidestep a corporation’s separateness to gain a 
personal tax advantage). 
11 
evading state or federal policy.39 But the “doctrine of piercing the 
corporate veil” remains “the rare exception, applied in the case of fraud or 
certain other exceptional circumstances.”40 In Masterpiece Cakeshop, as 
in most of the other similar cases, there was no indication that corporate 
formalities had been disregarded or that fraud had been committed. On 
the contrary, the company did not ask that the corporate veil be 
disregarded on any basis other than religious belief. When a corporation is 
created to circumvent state policy, veil piercing allows state policy to be 
effectuated. But in Masterpiece Cakeshop, exactly the opposite was 
occurring. Piercing the veil allowed for the circumvention of the state 
policy against discrimination. 
 
 To disregard corporate separateness in constitutional cases would 
create significant doctrinal uncertainty. Corporate separateness offers 
certainty in both corporate law and constitutional law; to relax that notion 
on the constitutional side would create the difficulties avoided on the 
corporate side by clear rules of separateness. If, for example, controlling 
shareholders can project their political and religious views onto the 
enterprise, courts will be forced to resolve questions about what degree 
and type of ownership constitutes control—a question to which corporate 
law provides no ready answer.41 Would the religious shareholder have to 
own all the company’s shares, a majority of shares, or simply be 
sufficiently dominant to control the company’s management? Similarly, 
courts will have to determine the degree of unanimity among shareholders 
that would allow them to project their views onto the corporate entity. 
Even among family companies and closely-held enterprises, shareholders 
will have a variety of views as to religion, politics, and whether the 
company should discriminate. (Even in Masterpiece, it was not clear from 
the record whether Phillips was the majority or minority shareholder, and 
the religious beliefs of his shareholding spouse were only presumed.) 
 
39 See, e.g., Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349, 362-63 (1944); Ill. Bell Tel. Co. v. 
Glob. NAPS Ill., Inc., 551 F.3d 587, 598 (7th Cir. 2008); Brotherhood of 
Locomotive Eng’rs v. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co., 210 F.3d 18, 26-27 (1st Cir. 
2000); see also Peter B. Oh, Veil-Piercing, 89 Texas L. Rev. 81 (2010); David 
Millon, The Still-Elusive Quest to Make Sense of Veil-Piercing, 89 TEXAS L. REV. 
15 (2010); Thompson, supra, note 35. 
40 Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 475 (2003). 
41 See, e.g., Alex Poor & Michelle Reed, The “Control” Quagmire: The 
Cumbersome Concept of “Control” for the Corporate Attorney, 44 SEC. REG. L.J. 
ART. 1 (2016); Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 757 n.19 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). For a 
description of how these definitional difficulties were glossed over in the Hobby 
Lobby case, see Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate Law and Theory in Hobby Lobby, 
in The Rise Of Corporate Religious Liberty (Micah Schwartzman, Chad Flanders, 
& Zoë Robinson, eds., 2016). 
12 
Other difficulties abound. For example, it is standard for privately-
held companies to have common shares and several series of preferred 
shares. How would courts determine which shareholder class’s views and 
beliefs are to be projected onto the company? Another quandary would 
arise when a corporation is in the vicinity of insolvency. In such a 
situation, Delaware corporate law says that creditors become “the 
principal constituency injured by any fiduciary breaches that diminish the 
firm’s value.”42 In that context, would creditors’ beliefs be thus projected 
onto the corporation? Consider also the difficulties that would arise in the 
context of a transfer of control from one shareholder or group of 
shareholders to another. If a majority shareholder without religious beliefs 
wishes to sell to a buyer who does, would such a difference be material to 
regulators and providers of capital and thus a proper subject of required 
disclosure under federal securities law? Or could a religious seller mandate 
by contract that the sold enterprise maintain its religious personality after 
a sale?43 Additional difficulties would arise when the enterprises asserting 
religious beliefs are limited liability companies. Should courts distinguish 
between manager-managed LLCs (such as Masterpiece Cakeshop) and 
member-managed LLCs? If so, should courts inquire into the degree of 
manager involvement? Finally, it is routine for companies to incorporate 
in Delaware when they in fact operate elsewhere.44 Should that matter in 
the analysis? 
 
These corporate law difficulties are inherent in any doctrinal effort 
to expand constitutional protections to corporations based on the views of 
shareholders. These difficulties do not vanish if constitutional veil piercing 
is restricted to closely-held corporations or even family-run enterprises. As 
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg emphasized in Hobby Lobby, “‘[c]losely held’ 
is not synonymous with ‘small.’”45 Some large and prominent 
corporations—Cargill ($113.5 billion in revenues, 160,000 employees), 
Koch Industries ($110 billion in revenues, 130,000 employees), Albertsons 
($60.5 billion in revenues, 267,000 employees), Deloitte ($46.2 billion in 
revenues, 310,000 employees), and PricewaterhouseCoopers ($42.4 
 
42 N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 
102 (Del. 2007). 
43 See Elizabeth Sepper, Zombie Religious Institutions, 112 Nw. U. L. Rev. 929 
(2018) (describing the rise of “zombie religious institutions” that have contractual 
commitments to religious identity but lack actual attachments to churches or 
associations of religious people). 
44 See Frederick Tung, Before Competition: Origins of the Internal Affairs 
Doctrine, 32 J. CORP. L. 33 (2006-07); Kent Greenfield, Democracy and the 
Dominance of Delaware in Corporate Law, 67 LAW & CONT. PROB. 135 (2004). 
45 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores Inc., 573 U.S. at 757 n.19 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
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billion in revenues, 276,000 employees), for example—are privately held.46 
To complicate matters further, some “family owned” companies are 
gigantic: Walmart and Ford are both examples of corporations with major 
share ownership retained in one family.47 
 
Finally, it is worth noting that the fundamental principle of 
separateness is not undermined by any notion of shareholder primacy—
i.e., the theory that shareholder interests should be prioritized over those 
of other corporate stakeholders. A mainstream view in corporate law holds 
corporations should be managed with the financial interests of 
shareholders utmost in management’s mind.48 But most states explicitly 
allow management to take into account non-shareholder interests,49 and 
the notion of shareholder primacy has been and continues to be widely 
contested within the field as both a descriptive and normative matter.50 In 
any event, these different views on shareholder primacy do not undermine 
the principle of corporate separateness. Shareholder primacy is simply a 
description of one view of the fiduciary duties of management. It does not 
mean that shareholders and the corporation are identical as a matter of 
legal rights and obligations. 
 
III. The Implications of Separateness for Right-to-Discriminate Claims 
 
 There is no doubt that existing doctrine allows for corporations to 
bring constitutional claims and to assert constitutional rights, including 
 
46 See Forbes, America’s Largest Private Companies 2019, available at 
https://www.forbes.com/largest-private-companies/list/. 
47 See Wal-Mart Says Walton Family To Sell Shares To Keep Lid on Stake, 
Reuters (April 10, 2015), available at http://tinyurl.com/z; Christina Rogers, 
Shareholders Again Back Ford Family, WALL ST. J. (May 12, 2016), available at 
http://tinyurl.com/ybdhv97n. 
48 See Leo E. Strine, The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear-eyed 
Understanding of the Power and Accountability Structure Established by the 
Delaware General Corporation Law, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761, 776-77 (2015) 
(executives who take care of an “interest other than stockholder wealth” breach 
their fiduciary duties); Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing 
Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833 (2005). 
49 See Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical Framework for 
Enforcing Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 TEXAS L. REV. 579 (1992). 
50 See E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 
HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932); see also LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH 
(2012); KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW (2006); Stephen M. 
Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 
97 NW. U. L. REV. 547 (2003); David K. Millon, New Directions In Corporate 
Law: Communitarians, Contractarians, And The Crisis In Corporate Law, 50 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1373 (1993). 
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free speech51 and, we will assume, even religious rights.52 While we do not 
agree with all aspects of current doctrine in this respect, we do believe that 
corporations and other business entities can be proper constitutional 
claimants.53 But the constitutional claims corporations assert must be 
those of the entity itself, not its shareholders. 
 
In the iconic Pentagon Papers case, for example, the New York 
Times and the Washington Post claimed a First Amendment right to 
release secret documents the Nixon administration sought to keep 
hidden.54 Both papers were for-profit, corporate entities. The Court 
validated the rights of the papers to publish the documents, and rightly so. 
The constitutional rights in question were those of the newspapers 
themselves (and by extension the readers of the newspapers), not the 
shareholders of the companies. The constitutional right of newspapers to 
publish material critical of the government is a function of the importance 
of such material to democracy and public discourse. The desires and 
interests of the shareholders of the companies publishing the papers were 
completely immaterial to the constitutional analysis. If anything, the 
shareholders of the companies could have been injured by the decision to 
publish because of fines, litigation costs, and the risk of retaliation.55 But 
their objections, if any, were a matter of internal corporate governance and 
had no effect whatsoever on the standing of the corporations to claim the 
rights of free press and speech. The Court did not inquire whether the 
shareholders approved or disapproved of the newspapers’ asserted rights; 
indeed it would have been bizarre if it had. 
  
In this respect, for-profit corporations are distinct from 
membership associations, in that the latter represent and embody the legal 
 
51 See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Brown v. Ent. 
Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011); United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 
405 (2001); see also Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (striking down 
limits on independent political expenditures by nonprofit and for-profit 
corporations). 
52 While no case prior to Masterpiece Cakeshop stands for the proposition that 
for-profit corporations can be proper claimants under the religion clauses, we do 
not rest our argument on the notion that a for-profit company can never have 
such interests. For an expanded treatment of this question, see GREENFIELD, 
CORPORATIONS ARE PEOPLE TOO,  supra, note 17 at 95-100. Here, we make the 
lesser point that corporations’ religious claims, if they exist at all, cannot be mere 
projections of shareholders’ religious views. 
53 See GREENFIELD, CORPORATIONS ARE PEOPLE TOO, supra, note 17 ; Kent 
Greenfield, In Defense of Corporate Persons, 30 CONST. COMM. 309 (2015). 
54 New York Times Co., 403 U.S. 713. 
55 The movie The Post made these risks clear. See THE POST (Twentieth Century 
Fox 2017). 
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interests of their members, are deemed to share the values of their 
members, and have standing to sue on their members’ behalf.56 
Corporations, in contrast, are legally distinct entities; they are legal 
persons in their own right. Their shareholders may have idiosyncratic 
investment objectives, distinctive and variable economic needs, and a 
diversity of political and religious beliefs. ExxonMobil and Masterpiece 
Cakeshop are not the Boy Scouts or the NAACP.57 Though the Supreme 
Court may have once theorized corporations as akin to membership 
associations in some cases, that characterization no longer fits modern 
corporations, modern shareholding, or modern corporate law.58 
 
Corporations stand in their own shoes as a matter of free speech 
law. Corporations, to be sure, can have a role to play in public discourse,59 
but they should not be presumed to act as conduits for the shareholders’ 
points of view or to have standing to assert their shareholders’ 
constitutional interests. 
  
Having said that, we can imagine situations in which corporations’ 
constitutional arguments do depend (at least in part) on characteristics of 
their shareholders. Consider, for example, the case of Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Peña,60 which challenged the federal government 
practice of giving preferential treatment, including additional 
compensation, to private contractors who subcontracted with companies 
controlled by racial minorities. The case concerned the government’s 
award of such additional compensation to a contractor that awarded a 
subcontract to Gonzales Construction Company, which the government 
had certified as a “disadvantaged business enterprise.” Under federal law, 
companies could receive that certification if they were “owned and 
controlled” by individuals who were considered “socially and economically 
disadvantaged,” including individuals who are “Black, Hispanic, Asian 
Pacific, Subcontinent Asian, [or] Native American.” Another contractor, 
Adarand Constructors, Inc., not so certified, sued to stop the government 
from offering advantages to contractors that subcontracted with minority 
businesses. Adarand claimed the law violated its right to equal protection. 
 
56 See Hunt v. Wash. St. Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977). 
57 See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000); NAACP v. Button, 371 
U.S. 415 (1963). 
58 See Margaret M. Blair & Elizabeth Pollman, The Derivative Nature of 
Corporate Constitutional Rights, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1673, 1707 (2015) 
(describing changes in corporations in the late nineteenth century that were “at 
odds” with associational view). 
59 See First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
60 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
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 In effect, Adarand was saying that the winner of the contract, 
Gonzales Construction, had a race, and its race worked to Adarand’s 
disadvantage. This was a paradigmatic equal protection claim: the 
claimant alleges that the government is imposing burdens and bestowing 
benefits on the basis of a suspect racial classification. The only oddity was 
that the claim was brought by a for-profit corporation. The federal statute 
classified the subcontractors according to criteria that included the racial 
composition of those who “owned or controlled” them. Some corporations 
benefited from the classification and some were hurt by it. One way to read 
the Court’s ruling striking down the classification would be that a 
corporation should be considered to have a race, and it should be 
presumed to have the race of its shareholders. 
 
 This case is relevant to our discussion of speech and religious rights 
in the discrimination cases because the analogy is tempting.61 If a 
corporation can have a race, based on the race of its shareholders, why 
should it not have a religion based on the religion of its shareholders? 
 
 But that is not the correct way to understand Adarand. The Court 
in Adarand did not hold that corporations have the race of their 
shareholders.62 The better way to understand Adarand is as support for 
the corporation’s standing to bring a constitutional equal protection claim 
if it is being regulated to its disadvantage on the basis of the race of its 
shareholders (or the race of another corporation’s shareholders). This 
makes constitutional sense. We believe Adarand was wrongly decided in 
that it subjected remedial racial classifications to strict scrutiny, but the 
Court was not incorrect in assuming the corporation was a proper plaintiff 
to bring the constitutional claim. That does not mean the corporation has 
the race of its shareholders, however. It means, instead, that the 
corporation has standing to bring an equal protection claim if it is 
disadvantaged by a law that classifies it according to the race of its 
shareholders. The same would be true if the corporation was being 
classified according to the race of its employees or customers.63 The 
 
61 During oral argument in Hobby Lobby, Chief Justice John Roberts asked the 
government lawyer a pointed question as to whether corporations could have a 
race. Transcript of Oral Argument at 53, Burwell v Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 
U.S. 682 (2014) (No. 13-354). 
62 See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 263 
(1977) (reasoning that corporations "ha[ve] no racial identity and cannot be the 
direct target of … alleged [racial] discrimination") 
63 Cf. Richard R.W. Brooks, Incorporating Race, 106  COLUM. L. REV. 2023, 2077 
(2006) (“when characterizing the corporation's race, the relevant decisionmaker 
may also look beyond the shareholders' race. There are a number of plausible 
nonshareholder bases from which corporate racial identity may be derived. The 
relevant decisionmaker might look to the corporation's customers, managers, 
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problem is the classification based on race plus the disparate treatment of 
corporations based on the classification. The corporation has standing to 
bring the claim because it is the corporation that suffers the injury from 
the classification. 
 
 Here again, we should resist importing into constitutional doctrine 
unconsidered or contested notions about corporate law. Shareholders and 
corporations are not the same, and constitutional law should not assume 
they are. Courts can respect corporate “personhood” — they can consider 
corporations distinct from their shareholders — while simultaneously 
believing it to be constitutionally illegitimate for the government to 
distinguish among corporations on the basis of the race of their 
shareholders.64 The classification itself is constitutionally problematic, 
regardless of whether the classification is on the basis of the race of the 
shareholders, employees, or customers. It is the corporation that is 
injured by the classification, and the corporation is a proper constitutional 
claimant in such a case. 
 
 One could imagine an Adarand-type case that would arise on the 
basis of a religious classification. A jurisdiction that purposely imposed a 
burden of some kind on a corporation because the company had a 
dominant shareholder who was religious would violate the Exercise 
Clause.65 The same would be true if a burden were imposed because a 
corporation’s typical customers or employees were of a certain religion. In 
either case a corporation hurt by those laws would be a proper 
constitutional claimant. But that would not mean that the company’s 
constitutional interests were the mere projection of the interests of its 
shareholder or employees. Instead, the classification itself was the 
problem, and the harmed party was a corporation, and the corporation can 
bring its own claim. 
 
 But it is inapt to draw an analogy between cases like Masterpiece 
Cakeshop and Adarand. In the latter, the law at issue made distinctions 
among corporations based on a suspect racial classifications. The law was 
by definition non-neutral. Compare this with the claims typically made 
when corporations assert a constitutional right to discriminate. The 
regulations at issue — anti-discrimination laws that apply to companies 
 
employees, or other agents, in addition to where the business is located, the 
communities it serves, and its principal activities and purposes.”). 
64 For a more comprehensive discussion of this point, see GREENFIELD, 
CORPORATIONS ARE PEOPLE TOO, supra, note 17 at xxx. 
65 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. and Ernesto Pichardo v. City of 
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993); Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. 
Comer, 582 U.S. ___ (2017). 
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doing business as public accommodations — do not target companies 
whose shareholders (or employees or customers) are members of a given 
religion or hold certain political beliefs. The regulations are generally 
applicable, and no corporation is disadvantaged by a classification of its 
shareholders (or employees or customers). The companies are not 
disadvantaged vis-a-vis other companies at all, and the companies 
themselves do not suffer any market disadvantage or constitutional harm. 
On the contrary, in these cases the corporations are asserting a right that 
would give them a comparative advantage vis-a-vis other companies — a 
waiver of regulations that apply to every other company. (More on this in 
Part IV.) 
 
 In cases such as Masterpiece Cakeshop, the shareholders do not 
suffer as shareholders in any way. Of all the corporate stakeholders, it is 
only religious employees who are even arguably burdened by an anti-
discrimination law since they are the ones who must act in the workplace 
in a way that (according to them) is inconsistent with their religious or 
political views. Here again, constitutional doctrine needs to be aware of 
distinctions long made in corporate law. Shareholders are not the 
company, and the roles, rights, and obligations of shareholders are 
different from the roles, rights, and obligations of employees. This is true 
even when a given individual is both an employee and a shareholder. In 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, for example, Jack Phillips was both a shareholder 
of the company and its employee, and it is crucial to make a distinction in 
the analysis as to what he was required to do as a shareholder and as an 
employee. Colorado law did not require him to do, say, or create anything 
as a shareholder that even arguably violated his political and religious 
beliefs. To the extent state law required him to act contrary to his beliefs, it 
did so in his role as an employee of a company designated as a public 
accommodation under Colorado law. 
 
But the company did not assert a constitutional claim on behalf of 
its employees. The rights of employees to assert a religious objection to a 
work requirement of an employer or to a requirement of state or federal 
anti-discrimination law is a separate question. If Masterpiece had a 
corporate speech interest at issue, it was not because it had an employee 
who disagreed with Colorado law. For the company to have a claim, it 
would have to allege that the company qua company has been coerced into 
saying or doing something contrary to “those properties which the charter 
of its creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its very 
existence.”66 There is nothing inherent in the operation of Masterpiece 
Cakeshop or in its chartering documents that would make obedience to 
state anti-discrimination law inconsistent with “its very existence.” 
 
66 Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819). 
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 This is not to say that corporations cannot assert First Amendment 
interests, but merely that courts should take care that the rights asserted 
belong to the corporation and not to someone else. If Phillips — or a 
religious employee of any company — had an individual First Amendment 
interest here, it cannot be used as the basis for a regulatory waiver for the 
company. Even if the individual employee could assert a constitutional 
right to be exempted from state law obligations, the company cannot 
leverage a solitary employee’s objections as the basis for a company-wide 
exemption from those obligations. Nor can a company present the 
religious or political beliefs of a single shareholder, a group of 
shareholders, or even the majority of shareholders, as its own. 
Corporations are legal persons distinct from their shareholders; a 
company’s constitutional claims are its own and cannot be derived from 
mere projections of alleged burdens on the shareholders. 
 
IV. Skepticism of Corporate Claims of Regulatory Exemptions 
 
 The corporate status of a party asserting a constitutional defense to 
a claim of discrimination matters not only in evaluating who “owns” the 
claim but also in evaluating its sincerity. In both free speech and free 
exercise cases, courts typically do not inquire deeply into the sincerity of 
the beliefs asserted.67 But when corporations are the constitutional 
claimants, there is reason to be less sanguine about the sincerity of the 
asserted beliefs, especially when the asserted interest would operate to 
exempt for-profit entities from regulations applicable to competitors. 
 
Cases that turn on the sincerity of political and religious beliefs are 
examples of situations in which the economic nature of corporations 
should make a difference in constitutional analysis. We say this even 
though in most First Amendment cases the economic nature of the 
corporation should not affect the constitutional analysis. Economic 
motivations for speech should not necessarily receive a lower level of 
constitutional respect than non-pecuniary motivations. There is no 
intrinsic reason why economic arguments and values are constitutionally 
different from the charitable, and democratic debate often depends on 
economic matters and benefits from the views and expertise of those 
involved in the market.68 For example, in the public debate over increases 
in the minimum wage, speakers on both sides of the question may be 
motivated in whole or in part by financial and economic concerns. But that 
does not mean that the arguments either for or again a wage increase 
 
67 See Dale, 530 U.S. 640; Hurley, 515 U.S. at 573-74. 
68 See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 777 (“The inherent worth of the speech in terms of its 
capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its source, 
whether corporation, association, union, or individual.”). 
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should receive lower levels of protection than if they were motivated by 
altruism or public spiritedness. 
 
This general rule needs adjustment, however, in situations in which 
an assertion of belief would operate to give a for-profit entity an exemption 
from regulations applicable to competitors. Because of their economic 
nature, corporations tend to seek market advantages wherever and 
however they can. Human beings are of course motivated by self-interest, 
but it is the rare human who reduces all decisions to the economic. And 
though it is possible for for-profit corporations to care about the non-
economic – just as humans can care about the economic – the nature of 
corporations is that they are uniquely and particularly focused on gaining 
competitive advantage. Such is their essence and purpose, and if they fail 
to achieve it, they will cease to exist. 
 
 But marketplace success can come by way of regulatory advantage 
as well as competitive advantage. If a company is able to avoid regulatory 
requirements applicable to competitors, it will gain a competitive 
advantage that will flow financially to its bottom line.  Because for-profit 
corporations exist to seek out economic advantage, when they can gain 
competitive advantage over other market participants by asserting 
political beliefs, they will have a tendency to overstate or manufacture 
such beliefs. Companies that do not assert constitutionally protected 
beliefs will find themselves competing at a disadvantage on grounds that 
have nothing to do with efficiency.69 
 
 In cases like Masterpiece Cakeshop, the corporation asserts 
religious and political beliefs to obtain an exemption from anti-
discrimination law its competitors are required to obey. The religious 
companies win a competitive advantage not from the quality of their 
products or services but from their assertion of religious beliefs. It is no 
answer to this concern to assert that discriminatory companies suffer a 
competitive disadvantage by refusing service to certain customers. For one 
thing, it is hardly clear that denial of service to a politically disfavored 
group imposes costs on a business. The opposite may be true if the 
business can seize upon their discriminatory purpose as a way to create a 
 
69 See Mark Tushnet, Do For-Profit Corporations Have Rights of Religious 
Conscience?, 99 CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 70, 79 (2013)(“the religiously 
structured business exempted from a regulatory requirement does have a 
competitive advantage over businesses that compete within that niche for purely 
commercial reasons... the existence of that competitive advantage provides an 
incentive to represent that one has religious objections to compliance with some 
regulatory requirement.”). 
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market niche of like-minded customers.70 Moreover, in an efficient 
marketplace, the denial of service to a segment of the population raises 
costs to that population by narrowing their choices. And it is often costly to 
comply with laws requiring companies to enact and follow policies and 
practices to guard against discrimination. For these reasons, corporations 
should not be empowered to invoke at will the political or religious views 
of their shareholders in order to obtain exemptions from generally 
applicable laws and regulations that the corporation finds too costly. 
 
It is worth remembering that anti-discrimination protections are 
not the only laws that corporations could attack on the basis of putative 
religious or political beliefs. Corporations’ claims to be exempt from anti-
discrimination laws may serve as a template for claims to be released from 
other regulatory obligations. Some corporate directors might in fact 
consider themselves duty-bound to adopt the political views of some 
subset of the company’s shareholders in order to claim exemptions from 
the greatest numbers of applicable laws and regulations. A corporate claim 
to be exempted from minimum wage laws or pollution limits could result 
from a shareholder’s sincerely-held belief in laissez faire economics.71 A 
corporation whose dominant shareholder believes a woman’s place is in 
the home could sue to be exempted from state or federal parental leave 
mandates.72 A corporation with a religiously devout shareholder could 
assert the right to require employees to attend devotional services as a 
condition of employment, in contravention of Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act.73 
 
 Recognizing or allowing corporations to assert the political and 
religious views of their shareholders would create a slippery slope that is 
unnecessary and easily avoidable. Without rigorous judicial scrutiny of the 
sincerity and good faith of a corporation’s putative political and religious 
 
70 See Amanda Holpuch, Chick-fil-A Appreciation Day Brings Huge Crowds to 
Fast-Food Chain, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 1, 2012), available at 
http://tinyurl.com/y8veq28m (describing how eating at fast food chain Chick-fil-
a became an act of resistance by opponents of LGBTQ+ rights). 
71 Cf. Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 303 (1985) 
(considering nonprofit organization’s claim that minimum wage laws infringed 
its free exercise rights). 
72 Cf. Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist Church, 899 F.2d 1389, 1392 (4th Cir. 1990) 
(considering religious school’s claim for an exemption from the Fair Labor 
Standards Act so that it could pay female teachers less than male teachers and 
below the minimum wage). 
73 See EEOC v. Townley Eng’g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding 
that, notwithstanding the deeply held beliefs of the shareholders, a 
manufacturing company could not require a non-religious employee to attend a 
mandatory “devotional service” each week). 
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beliefs, companies can claim a “Road to Damascus” conversion on any 
number of political or religious concepts. The risk of subterfuge and 




 Corporate “personhood” has long been controversial. The concept 
became even more so after the Supreme Court expanded corporate speech 
rights in Citizens United in 2010 and recognized corporate religious 
interests in  Hobby Lobby in 2014.74 Both cases were roundly criticized as 
inappropriately expanding corporate “personhood.” 
 
 Perhaps ironically, however, a proper understanding of corporate 
personhood should result in a restriction of corporate rights in cases in 
which a corporation claims exemption from otherwise applicable laws on 
the basis of the political views or religious beliefs of its shareholders. One 
aspect of corporate personhood is that the corporation is its own legal 
entity, with its own legal claims, and with its own constitutional interests. 
The corporation is not the same as its shareholders, and corporate law has 
long insisted on the distinction between the two. Indeed, shareholders 
themselves have long enjoyed protections and benefits arising from this 
longstanding distinction. The constitutional claims of corporations, then, 
must be based on something more than a mere projection of their 
shareholders’ interests or beliefs. 
 
 In discrimination cases such as Masterpiece Cakeshop and others 
percolating through the lower courts, it is pivotal that this distinctions 
between corporation and shareholders be maintained. Corporations 
should not be allowed to defend against discrimination actions brought 
against them by asserting the religious or political interests of their 
shareholders. The corporate tub must sit on its own bottom. If 
shareholders and corporations are distinct as a matter of corporate law, 
they should be distinct as a matter of constitutional law. 
 
 
74 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310; Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. 682. 
